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DDI Registry



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

DDI #02604-85
21 May 1985

NOTE TO: Director, OGI
Director, OEA

In a recent talk with [redacted]
who spent several weeks at USTR, I asked
her to put on paper her thoughts about
how we were meeting the needs of a
Special Trade Representative and what
more we might do to improve our support.
I find her suggestions and comments of
value and believe you will as well. [redacted]

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. Gates".

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:
As Stated

cc: D/OCR

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12 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]
Senior Analyst, OCR/EA/Asia

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SUBJECT : Analytic Support [REDACTED]

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1. As you requested, I have summarized here what I have learned in a few weeks at USTR about what the DI can do to be even more helpful in its efforts to support policymakers [REDACTED]. The comments made to me by people at USTR about existing DI products and the sorts of products some trade negotiators would like to have the DI undertake have a few basic themes:

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(a) An even more visible presence of DI analysts is wanted. We are encouraged to find a new mechanism, such as regular attendance at meetings of interagency working groups, to become even more familiar with what diverse policymakers and their staffs already know and need to know on trade issues. Although attendance at such meetings is expensive in terms of the time required to travel downtown, especially given that the meetings vary in utility, such meetings enable analysts to better focus their efforts on the most critically needed support and to time their efforts to meet the deadlines of policymakers. [REDACTED]

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(b) Shorter, simpler products are better. Negotiators have told me that they prefer more frequent products in the form of a quick telephone call or a one or two page answer to a question on a fast breaking issue. Analysis written on fast breaking issues should be disseminated immediately and, when appropriate, later folded into long term, in depth research products. In the absence of quick responses, policymakers often act on the basis of raw intelligence reports without the benefit of the larger context and perspective an analyst can provide. [REDACTED]

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(c) Basic information is sometimes needed more urgently than complex analytical pieces. We are encouraged to broaden our perspective on what we produce as analysts to include providing at times more basic information, such as interpretation of raw intelligence, that requires detailed, careful research based on facts or statistics. [REDACTED]

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied